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Perceptual Dramaturgy: Swimmer (68)
Pil Hansen
[E]very act of perception is, to some degree, an act of 
creation, and every act of memory is, to some degree, an act of 
imagination.
—Gerald M. Edelman and Giulio Tononi, A Universe 
 of Consciousness1
This essay proposes a form of perceptual dramaturgy: a set of tools that has 
been developed through the application of a cognitive lens to the craft of dramaturgy. 
I argue that theories of perception and memory can enable the dramaturg to work 
with some of the implicit dynamics of experience that precede both artistic choice-
making in the developmental process and the spectator’s arrival at interpretation 
in performance. As the theoretical basis and tools of perceptual dramaturgy are 
introduced, I explore their application through the case of the devised solo piece 
Swimmer (68).
Swimmer (68) is an intermedial solo performance about a character’s struggle 
to develop and maintain an autobiographical self by negotiating lived and mediated 
experiences from his past. Imagine an adult who has been isolated in a nonmaterial 
environment, recycling and integrating memories, since childhood. This is the 
character’s (admittedly impossible) condition. Suddenly faced with an audience, he 
begins to sense and examine gaps in his reenactment of memories. Swimmer (68) 
is performed by the devisor Ker Wells, directed by Bruce Barton, and dramaturged 
by myself, with the sound artist Richard Windeyer and the video artist Cam Davis. 
In addition to the application of cognitive theory to the dramaturgical process, the 
production team took creative inspiration from cognitive ideas about subjectivity 
and autobiographical memory. These ideas were used to define principles that could 
be consulted as signposts rather than a set of strict rules.
The analytical demonstration of perceptual dramaturgy is divided into three 
sections that respond to the specific dramaturgical tasks and challenges of three 
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developmental stages of Swimmer (68): (1) understanding the collaborators’ habits 
of perception at the stage of project initiation; (2) proposing principles and sources 
of inspiration that can either challenge or establish connections between artistic 
approaches in the workshop phase; and (3) preparing for the final production phase 
by analyzing compositional possibilities with a focus on how they can be realized 
through the spectators’ potential perception. 
This essay joins a growing number of voices calling for the development of 
new dramaturgical functions and tools in response to the increased involvement 
of dramaturgs in contemporary “postdramatic theatre.” Historically, and within 
established institutions, the dramaturg’s job description has fallen into either 
production dramaturgy or new play development. When working on physically-
based performance that does not take its point of departure in a text or a preset 
choreographic score, this division of agency—between development and 
production—ceases to make sense. If there is a shift between development and 
production in such projects it is not from a text or a score to its realization; it tends 
to be from the generation of ideas and loosely interconnected performance material 
to the making of compositional choices. The devising dramaturg can benefit from 
drawing on both the process-oriented tools of developmental dramaturgy and the 
conceptual and analytical tools of production dramaturgy, but this expanded field 
of agency and orientation does not, in itself, provide solutions to the challenges 
of new dramaturgy. Physically-based work often aims to affect the spectators’ 
sensory experience in ways that do not invite them to synthesize stimuli as dramatic 
structure, character, or meaning. In response to this characteristic, a need arises 
for tools to analyze and make strategic choices about the perceptual experience a 
composition facilitates. 
Reflecting a growing awareness of these needs, the creative approach and 
analytical tools of perceptual dramaturgy were initially developed in 2007 and 
have subsequently been applied and adapted to the creation of new opera, theatrical 
devising, modern dance, improvisational events, new circus, and puppetry in 
Denmark, Sweden, and Canada.2 As I begin to discuss perceptual dramaturgy in 
the context of Swimmer (68), it is a matured generation of the approach and its 
tools that I turn to.
Initiated in a workshop in the summer of 2008, Swimmer (68) underwent 
further development in May and December of 2009, the latter period concluding 
with a work-in-progress performance. Final development and production, funded 
by the Toronto and Ontario Arts Councils, is scheduled for May 2011 in Toronto. 
The performance material has been devised through physically-based 
improvisation and writing tasks and inspiration has been drawn from Wells’s 
childhood memories, photos, news broadcasts, and movies from the late 1960s, 
including Fran Perry’s The Swimmer (1968). At its current stage of development, 
the material includes thirteen scenes that alternate between two types of sequences. 
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In one type of sequence, the character rests on a chair, immobile, and a voiceover 
states, “I have only had one dream. In the dream, I am in a room with no door. I am 
sitting in a chair, trying to remember something.”3 The memory is expanded over 
several repetitions of the scene until the character physically, without speaking, 
opens a window and discovers water on the other side. The other, more dominant 
sequence is a series of associative explorations of childhood memories in fragments, 
including mediated memories. The character gradually begins to remember more 
and more situations of watching and listening to media, instead of predominantly 
weaving mediated actions and voices into his lived memories without the ability to 
fully differentiate. In the final scene, the character constructs a new autobiographical 
narrative from selected aspects of the memories explored throughout the piece. 
In this scene the character reenacts rowing a boat out onto a lake with his sister 
to see the moon on the same night that the first moon landing was broadcast. The 
moon is reflected on the water’s surface and the character steps onto the reflection.
Reflecting on Habits of Perception at the Workshop Stage
At the end of the first developmental workshop in 2008, when I initially 
joined the project, the dramaturgical task was to help navigate the approaches, 
skills, and ideas in the studio. In general, a focus on the perceptual habits of the 
devisors can prove very useful at this stage of a devising project.4 If applied with 
the team’s creative objectives in mind, cognitive theory about learning, perception, 
and memory can lead to strategies for creative development. When, for instance, 
long-time collaborators aim to break out of a pattern and discover new forms 
of expression, the dramaturg can help introduce interdisciplinary challenges, 
unfamiliar techniques, and new source material to push the artists beyond the 
repetition of habitual forms of perception and response. But in projects like Swimmer 
(68), where a combination of very different approaches seriously challenges each 
collaborator’s skills and patterns of response, there may be a need for common 
principles to help the collaborators explore connections between their different 
approaches, and gradually adapt to each other’s perceptual habits through the work. 
The dramaturg also needs to be critically self-reflective about how her own approach 
influences what she is attentive to in order to adapt and further develop her skills. 
These strategies are informed by the implicit (i.e., unconscious) ways in 
which memory shapes our perception and response in the present and vice versa. 
Gerald Edelman and Giulio Tononi’s theory of “the remembered present” offers 
a useful insight into such dynamics of perception and memory.5 When directing 
one’s sensory registers toward a source of stimulus, an often prereflexive process 
of selection begins. As Edelman and Tononi put it, “[W]e extract the meaning or 
gist of a scene, rather than its innumerable and rapidly varying local details.”6 The 
different types of stimuli to which this selective attention gives a person access 
are processed within, transferred between, and returned to reciprocally connected 
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areas of the brain. Each return, or in Edelman and Tononi’s terminology “reentry,” 
of information results in further selection, integration, and synthesis of stimuli. 
One achieves consciousness about a perception at the stage of this process when a 
large core of the brain is engaged in reentrant interactions.7 The chemical change in 
the synapses that allows neurons to “fire and wire” together during the process of 
perception is not easy to establish, but once it is established—and if it is maintained 
through frequent usage—it can be repeated efficiently.8 Studies into neurological 
activity and learning show that the neural activity decreases when the efficiency of 
performance increases.9 As in the case of motor skill acquisition, “The number and 
range of sensory inputs that are initially ‘consulted’ for conscious control and that 
can influence the performance are enormous, including many details and irrelevant 
stimuli.”10 The initial task of processing all available stimuli results in enhanced 
brain activity and renders the person conscious of details. As the skill is learned 
the inputs are restricted and the reentrant process of perception it involves becomes 
more selective and efficient. This efficiency can decrease brain activity to the extent 
where a large core of the brain no longer becomes engaged. The consequence is 
that the performance and the perceptual process it entails remain unconscious and 
become automated.11 Such automated perceptual patterns and responses are what 
I refer to as perceptual habits. 
When memory enters the picture, it becomes clear that perceptual habits 
extend far beyond what is commonly understood as habitual routines. From the 
perspective of Edelman and Tononi’s theory, memory retrieval is the ability to 
trigger and repeat a reentrant process. Memory is not retrieved from an archive of 
stored representations; rather, it is a dynamic process.12 As most of our automated 
perceptions reuse established reentrant processes, they are memories projected 
into the present, which gives rise to Edelman and Tononi’s term “the remembered 
present.” This implicit repetition of a perceptual process, however, is rarely pure 
as new stimuli are integrated and change the process each time it is reused in the 
present. In effect, “memory has properties that allow perception to alter recall and 
recall to alter perception.”13 If discrepant stimuli render this repetition dysfunctional, 
conscious attention is once again directed toward the task of processing a vast 
amount of sensory details. When the habit therefore is challenged, a process of 
either radically altering the learned behavior or learning a new skill begins.14 
This theory provides the frame that I use when observing the habitual responses 
of actors in rehearsal. It also informs the previously mentioned strategies of 
disrupting repetitive behaviors, reducing hindrances that render the collaborators’ 
habits dysfunctional, or—as in Swimmer (68)—suggesting principles that can 
connect very different approaches to creation and performance. In the case of 
Swimmer (68), the task of identifying principles that could help Wells and Barton 
connect their approaches began with an attempt to understand these approaches 
in terms of what they do: what they make each collaborator attentive to and how 
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they produce different responses to shared source materials and ideas. The brief 
examples offered here derive from exchanges with Wells and Barton.15 
From the outset, Wells brought to the rehearsal studio techniques of actor-
centered and physically-based devising that draw upon the legacies of Grotowski 
and the Odin Theatre, techniques that are inherently suspicious of New Media. 
Wells’s devising process usually starts with the creation of a piece of physical 
material, drawing on associations from a chosen source of inspiration. Later in 
the process, the created piece will be taken apart and layered with other material. 
Regardless of whether or not Wells’s source of inspiration is autobiographical, his 
physical response to stimuli always involves some investment of his sense of self: 
[M]y choices of how to move and what action to choose to 
represent a certain moment or incident are deeply and constantly 
informed and influenced, both consciously and doubtless 
unconsciously, by memories of my own life, which flit unbidden 
into mind and body when I activate my creative imagination.16 
In order to keep this work in process, perceptions and associations are channelled 
into physical responses. The creative process is reflected upon, but the desire to 
analyze sensorimotor experience and prematurely arrive at an interpreted “product” 
is suppressed. 
Barton is both an artist and a scholar, specializing in theatrical devising and 
theory of intermediality. Like Wells, Barton is invested in the open process, though 
his strategy differs. He entertains multiple potential interpretations of performance 
material and its theoretical framework simultaneously and considers their ongoing 
revision and competition part of the process. When first presented with Wells’s 
source materials for Swimmer (68), Barton’s attention was on the media of 
photographic, televisual, radiophonic, and cinematic sources and his artistic inquiry 
became about the ways in which these media affect a person. This focus led him 
to challenge the concept of self that Wells’s approach depends on and argue that 
in a thoroughly intermedial world, 
Not only do we have the sense that, as the center of our own 
intermedial universe, we somehow possess and contain the 
storm of data to which we are subjected every day of our lives. 
At the same time, inevitably, we are faced with the unavoidable 
evidence of our own surrender to, our own consumption by, the 
spectacle of media, which doesn’t merely influence and affect, 
but in fact contributes to and makes coherent our understanding 
of our selves as “selfs.”17 
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When this theoretical perspective is followed through to its practical consequences 
in the rehearsal space, Barton does not need to begin with a physical response to 
media, as Wells does; he can introduce media that acts upon the performer, and then 
begin to discover how it may or may not contribute to the performer’s experience 
of embodiment and self. 
Though far apart, it is possible to intersect these approaches. In fact, when 
pushing a bit beyond the most immediate responses, the observation that served 
as the impetus for the project can both facilitate connection and make productive 
use of the differences. Wells was intrigued by an experience of uncertainty about 
the source of some of his childhood memories. It was unclear to him whether they 
reflected lived experience or media images he saw as a child; and his attempt to 
differentiate by recalling the moment of originally watching what he suspected to 
be mediated memories did not produce a stronger sense of certainty. Revisiting an 
example of this observation, which concerns one of his source materials for the 
project, Wells stated:
In my memory of my first viewing of The Swimmer, I am 
watching it beside a swimming pool, but I think that in fact what 
I am remembering here is the summer afternoon beside a pool 
in suburban Winnipeg, when someone, an older friend, first told 
me about the film . . . . Memory is tricky.18
Burt Lancaster’s character in The Swimmer decides to make his way from a 
pool party to his home through the adjacent private and public pools of his rich 
neighborhood.19 On this journey, his strong rapport, self-confidence, and physical 
health gradually deteriorate as he, piece-by-piece, retrieves memories of his personal 
and economic ruin. For the production team, Wells’s confused memory of this movie 
became a central source of inspiration for a theatrical exploration of whether one 
can differentiate between mediated and lived memories. Not surprisingly, given 
their different approaches, Wells and Barton had distinct understandings of how 
this question could be addressed in Swimmer (68):
[Wells] was initially invested in the character ultimately being 
successful at solving the riddle and finding the “one true memory” 
amidst the storm of media distraction. For my part, I toyed with 
the idea that the character might have to come to terms with the 
reality that he was, in fact, all media, that he had no existence 
outside of the patchwork of media sounds and images that made 
up his memories.20
The evolving understanding of the different approaches in the rehearsal space 
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after the first workshop in 2008 suggested that the shared interest in Wells’s initial 
observation was not enough; there was a need for a common understanding of the 
observation that is transferable—as a set of principles—to the relationship between 
the actor’s embodiment, the character, and the media in Swimmer (68).
Proposing Principles (of Memory and Self) to Connect Diverging Approaches
When developing ideas for transferable principles, I revisited the first 
performance material Barton and Wells presented to me. In this material (which 
since has been developed into scenes 2 and 4), Wells runs onto the stage through 
the audience. Dripping wet and wearing swimming trunks, he dries himself with a 
towel. Then he pulls on a pair of long pants and turns to look at the audience while 
raising his muscular arms and saying:
Look at me.
Look at me. 
I eat like a horse and I don’t put on an ounce. I’m sleeping well 
for the first time in months. You don’t know what’s coming down 
the tube, but the important thing is . . . 
He notices something on the floor and bends to pick it up. It’s a 
watch. He holds it to his ear. He puts it in his pocket.
. . . the important thing is watch for the signs, trust your instincts, 
and be at peace with yourself . . .
God! What a wonderful . . . what a wonderful . . . 
What is it, I had it just a minute ago.
[ . . . ] He takes the hands of a spectator and pulls her towards him.
Let me look at you.
You look sensational. Is that a new suit?
God it’s great to see you. What a vision.21 
Wells proceeds to pretend that he is slapped by the spectator and mumbles 
reassuringly to himself that, “[I]t’s ok, it’s ok,” while touching his face. He turns 
suddenly to pursue a fleeting image of Burt Lancaster in swimwear and there is a 
splashing sound, as if Wells had stepped into water. (Note: the play-text excerpted 
here is used to record words and key actions or movements as the devising 
progresses).
When watching this material it seemed to me that the character is trying to 
confirm his self at multiple levels—from the most basic sensorimotor experience of 
self involved in the sensation of water and touch to a more cognitively synthesized 
autobiographical self. As the next scene delves into the telling of childhood stories, 
the most obvious level of self-maintenance I witnessed is the ongoing reactivation 
of the episodic long-term memories that support the character’s autobiography.22 
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Yet Wells’s almost intimidating physical presence in this opening scene also 
reflects Lancaster’s attitude and activities in the early scenes of The Swimmer. 
The character’s episodic memories are infused with mediated components in ways 
that, when confronted with an audience, generates curiosity and confusion about 
who he is. 
When entering the second workshop in 2009, it was unclear to the creative team 
why the character is exploring memories, how he is exploring them, or to what the 
exploration might add up. Based on my observations, I suggested that answers to 
these questions could be discovered through the neurobiologist Antonio Damasio’s 
theory of autobiographical memory. Damasio argues that “the autobiographical self 
arises from the core self.”23 The core self is a basic experience of subjectivity that 
emerges repeatedly, but seamlessly, in response to sensorimotor exchange with an 
environment.24 The states that make up the core self are processed in both short-term 
and long-term memory and become the facts and episodes that are the basis of the 
autobiographical self. A person engaged with his environment would automatically 
sustain an illusion of core self continuity and develop an autobiographical self from 
new experiences.25 The memories of the autobiographical self are, in turn, recycled 
as parameters that influence choice behavior while in core self exchange in the 
present;26 and through that recycle these memories become confirmed and renewed.27 
Thinking about Swimmer (68) from this perspective, I wondered how a 
grown man’s autobiographical self would be affected if he had been isolated in a 
nonmaterial environment and hindered from engaging with his environment since 
childhood. The character of Swimmer (68) recalls and explores only memories 
and media images from the year of 1968, when Wells was six years old. What if 
the character had not been able to generate new core self experiences since then 
and was limited to recycling these memories? As Barton subsequently stated 
in a performance presentation at a Canadian Association of Theatre Research 
conference,
[It became] apparent to us that what our character is desperately 
attempting to assert is his autobiographical self, but that he has 
too few core self experiences to support that assertion . . . . Each 
scene became a heroic effort to compensate for his meagre store 
of embodied memories through resorting to the often vivid 
memories of mediation that seemed to bridge the gap.28
From a cognitive perspective—and if we imagine that these memories are recycled 
within the closed circuit of the character’s unnatural condition—the reentrant 
process of perception and memory could result in the integration of lived and 
mediated memories. The difference, however, between the lived memories and 
memories he has experienced through media, which he cannot fully erase, is that 
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the lived memories derive from his own fully embodied, core self experiences while 
the mediated memories do not. The character may have embodied memories that 
reflect the relation between a TV or radio and his body in the situation of taking 
in the media, but he would not have such memories of the sounds, images, and 
actions experienced through the media. Even if we were to turn toward Stamenov 
and Gallese’s popularized theory of the “mirror neuron system” and hypothesize 
that a moving body in a motion picture may trigger the viewer’s sensorimotor 
memory of similar movements, it does not generate a novel sensorimotor experience. 
Rather, the embodiment triggered would feed off a lived experience from the more 
distant past.29 When revisited by the character, the mediated memories are merely 
secondary channels to fully embodied experience; they are not the source of the 
experience. If the character never were an accomplished swimmer, then he would 
not be able to fully mirror Lancaster’s swimming. 
When understood from this perspective the character is unwittingly 
reactivating memories in the attempt to generate core self states and maintain an 
autobiographical self. The discussed difference between the lived and mediated 
memories, however, leaves detectable gaps and discrepancies which, when explored, 
cause doubt about the source of the memories. These possible explanations made 
us situate the character in the previously named isolated condition. Note that this 
condition is based on Wells’s own doubt about the source of his memories. Wells’s 
discomfort with New Media and his attempt to differentiate between the mediated 
and the “real” in the initial stage of the project feeds the character’s exploration 
of memories. The emphasis on the sensorimotor aspect of the memories and the 
experience of embodiment resonates with Wells’s creative approach and provides 
him with means to apply his skills within the otherwise unfamiliar performance 
vocabulary of intermedial work. In complementary ways, Barton’s approach makes 
it possible to weave mediated material into Wells’s devising process and arrive at 
an integrated construction of the character’s autobiographical self: a construction 
that is sufficiently believable and involves enough embodied memory to offer the 
character a kind of life support. 
Analyzing Compositional Possibilities as Potential Perceptual Paths
In preparation for the final production of Swimmer (68) in May 2011, the 
dramaturgical task shifts from developmental navigation to the identification of 
compositional problems and possibilities within the material developed to date. 
Drawing on the accumulated knowledge of the creative process and approaches 
discussed above, the analysis of the generated material needs to focus on two 
interrelated perceptual paths: one is the character’s attempt to recycle memory as 
present perception; the second is the audience’s potential experience of that attempt. 
To analyze the first path, it is necessary to look at how mediated and lived memories 
are combined in practice, that is, how the character engages them and explores the 
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combinations within the performance material and, ultimately, how he reacts to 
this experience. The second path is addressed here by asking what aspects of the 
performance the audience’s attention is drawn toward, how connections between 
such aspects are established through the spectators’ perception, and to what effect. 
While the first path is specific to the subject material and ideas of Swimmer (68), 
the second path is always addressed when analyzing compositional possibilities as 
perceptual dramaturgy. In very general terms, the necessary material and principles 
to facilitate both the character’s and the audience’s perceptions were present in the 
work-in-progress performance in 2009, but neither path had been fully realized. 
The goal is, thus, to identify compositional strategies that can lead to production 
solutions when explored in practice.
Because Swimmer (68) is created through a process of generating, layering, 
and combining material without the mould of a pre-imagined coherency or dramatic 
journey, the resulting creation is highly interspliced. The compositional challenge 
is not only to identify and map possible connections within the material, but also 
to predict the performative effect they may bring about. 
Since the tools that dramaturgs are trained to use (directly or indirectly) focus 
on meeting audience expectations of more conventional structures, it is necessary to 
become aware of this tendency and bring into focus the perception of sensory details 
that is otherwise forgotten on the route to dramatic synthesis and yet is central in 
most approaches to physically-based devising. This can be done by distinguishing 
between the principles that organize human perception into meaningful units (such 
as the logics of linearity, causality, and coherency) and the impressions of sensory 
details that are organized through these principles. Endel Tulving’s distinction 
between episodic and semantic systems of long-term memory is useful, particularly 
when related to the sensory registers and short-term memory described in Atkinson 
and Shiffrin’s classic memory system.30 The term “semantic memory” refers to 
synthesized, organized, and durable knowledge about the world, while the “episodic 
memory” is the memory of episodes and situations that often involve physical or 
verbal action. The impression of sensory details (e.g., the color or movement of 
an object) are held for a short duration in short-term memory, unless they become 
the focus of attention and further processing in long-term memory (e.g., when 
learning). Awareness of this process is useful in identifying moments when the 
spectator is encouraged during performance to direct her attention to details, such 
as singular sounds or pitches, objects and their qualities, movements or gestures. 
All three systems of memory can be used to categorize potential performance 
materials based on an assessment of whether they are likely to be processed and 
remembered as sensory detail, episodic situations, or semantic logic. The result is 
both an expanded field of orientation and an overview of the components that have 
the potential to be memorable.
In order to better understand how segments of performance material become 
Spring 2011                                                                                                           117
connected through the spectator’s perception, I return to Edelman’s concept of “the 
remembered present.” If we accept his claim that new stimuli tend to reactivate and 
merge with past perceptions (i.e., memories) during the reentrant processes, then it is 
possible that the repetition of details in different parts of a performance may create 
connections for the spectator simply by triggering the same perceptual process. 
When considering the types of effect such perceptual connections bring about, 
I draw upon the previously discussed difference between implicit and explicit 
reentrant processes. To understand this difference in practical terms, I developed 
the concepts of implicit assimilation, iterative association and adapted the concept 
of montage collision.31 Assimilation is achieved when the remembered perceptual 
process is repeated almost seamlessly in the present. When an experience is 
identified as an association, the perceiver usually has a definite, if unclear, sense 
of small discrepancies between the connected elements—a sense that renders 
conscious part of an otherwise implicit perceptual process. The gradual adaptation 
to these differences may result in iterative change of a perception. By montage 
collision I refer to instances where repeated material is inserted into contexts that 
render the repetition of a reentrant process dysfunctional; contexts that differ so 
significantly from the repeated material that the perceptual process it reactivates is 
breached. This also occurs when a pattern of repetition disappoints expectations. 
Such breaches force the spectator to consciously reorient expectations by focusing 
on and discovering new ways of organizing sensory details. This application 
of cognitive theory enables me to hypothesize about the potential connections 
and effects within the performance material that the interpersonal mechanics of 
perception can enable the spectator to make.32 
The simplest way to use these principles (i.e., categorization with reference to 
the sensory, episodic, and semantic systems, the creation of connections through 
repetition, and the range of possible effects) when analyzing the perceptual 
dramaturgy of a composition is to work through the following steps: First, note 
repetitions in the material and color code them in the categories of sensory 
details; episodic actions, relations, and situations; and semantic meaning or logic. 
Subcategories that can help the dramaturg develop a project-specific focus are 
drawn from the collaborators’ approaches and interests. When a net of repeated or 
similar material has been identified, the next step is to estimate whether the noted 
repetitions have the power to generate connections. Given the fact that perception 
and attention are highly selective, primed or foregrounded details are more likely 
to be recognized by the audience.33 Once this assessment has been made, the 
effect of the connections can be addressed: do they affect implicit assimilation, 
iterative association, or montage collision? A final step is to summarize the ways 
in which the work generally seeks to affect its audience and use it as a parameter 
for compositional choice making. 
When applied to Swimmer (68), the analysis of potential perceptual connections 
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and effects can help identify issues and develop strategies for the realization of the 
two perceptual paths. As previously mentioned, the devising process has produced 
a highly interspliced (and somewhat interconnected) performance material: a large 
number of words, phrases, and movements are repeated in multiple scenes. Not 
all repetitions, however, are likely to register with a spectator or help facilitate the 
two perceptual paths. The analysis can be used to weed out some of the less useful 
repetitions and strengthen the ones that can support the character’s exploration 
of memories, reveal the discrepancies caused by the difference between lived 
and mediated memories, yet produce a repertoire of repeatable and integrated 
experiences that offers the character the choice of constructing an autobiography 
in response to his dilemma—an autobiography that explains his condition. In the 
following example, repetitions are extracted from a single scene and discussed 
within the sensory, episodic, and semantic categories, respectively. A selection 
of these repetitions is then traced to their reoccurrences in other scenes, and their 
ability to generate connections and effects are discussed with the aim of identifying 
problems and suggesting possible strategies.  
 In scene 7, the character engages remembered fragments of an episode with 
his sister that are triggered by the memory of a photograph. The following telling 
moves along a stylized physical score, and the underscored text signals material 
that is repeated elsewhere in the piece.
In the foreground there’s a tricycle, tipped on its side, (look up) 
half out of the frame. As if the rider has just jumped off it. For 
a long time I thought she was the rider—that our parents had 
just asked her to sit for a photo, and she dropped the trike and 
half-sat on the chair and they took the picture.
(Starting to reach down)
But I think it was me that dropped it. Me that let go. I can feel 
a weight, falling from my hands. I can hear a wheel turning, 
ticking, as she moves away. I try to reach her, run after her. 
(Throw and run US)
(stop USC) Now there’s a rushing sound.
(look to SR) Ah. Sprinkler’s going. 
(At SR wall position, with face against it) That’s why I’m wet.
(go to DSC, hand out) Hands in the water.
She calls to me. She says “Where are you going? . . . ”
As the scene continues, statements such as, “Where are you going?” “I can’t 
breathe, I can’t hear,” and “take my hand,” are interspliced with remarks, cheering 
voices, and expressions of alarm from a 1968 political campaign. The remarks 
are loud, in Wells’s voice, and come from the speakers of a 1960s television set:34
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It’s so cold.
Face up like this, eyes half-closed. Sleepy boy.
The wheel has stopped ticking, and when she calls me, I can 
hear it all, except the name. (Hand to face) The sprinkler 
sprinkles over it, every time.
But I can see her calling me through the water.
Where are you going, name? Where are you going? . . . 
He has finished the physical score standing beside the chair with 
his head resting on the towel, which is draped over the back of 
the chair, as if it were a pillow. His eyes flutter and then close 
as if he is asleep. As he sleeps, an image of Lancaster from The 
Swimmer appears, flickering on the US wall behind him. His 
eyes snap open, and the image disappears.35
Attention to repeated sensory details that potentially could support the character’s 
experience of core self and embodiment is fairly strong in this scene. His attempt 
to engage the sensorimotor aspect of his memories is triggered by mediated 
components, but his engagement with the mediated memories does not differ from 
the lived ones in a consistent way that allows the spectator to perceive the difference 
and begin to experience the character’s problem.  
The character names some of the sensations involved in the episode he is 
trying to recall: the ticking sound, the feeling of water on his skin, the sensation 
of touch, eyes closing. At the same time the actor’s stylized movements proceed 
in unbroken flow through some gestures that could reflect his physical memory 
of the situation he describes, along with others that seem unrelated. Though the 
underlined terms and concepts are repeated elsewhere in the material, many of the 
accompanying movements are only used in this scene. Given that it is the lack of 
direct embodiment that makes the character’s mediated memories different from 
his lived ones, the described disconnect between the spoken and physical part 
of his memory recall could be used strategically to share the difference with an 
audience. It would, however, only work if the opposite principle is applied to the 
lived memories. At present, the spectators are repeatedly invited to direct their 
attention toward sensory details through the character’s engagement with them, 
but the seemingly unrelated physical actions and high volume statements from the 
TV may, in turn, diffuse their perception. As a consequence details may not register 
sufficiently to establish connections to repetitions elsewhere. This issue could, in 
part, be addressed by establishing a more consistent principle for the relationship 
between terms and movements.
The scene has the following four combined episodic layers: (1) the explicit 
exposure of the character’s act of remembering the photograph; (2) the fragments of 
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the recalled episode with his sister, including the situation in which the photograph 
might have been taken; (3) the 1968 political campaign; and (4) the act of calling for 
his sister. Out of these episodes the act of remembering, the attempt to call his sister 
to him, and the relationship to the sister are repeated in different forms throughout 
the material. Although singular sensory gestures from the election material are 
repeated elsewhere, the material is so interspliced and fragmented that it cannot 
establish perceptual connections within the episodic category. 
The primary invitation to make semantic sense of the material comes from 
repeated indications that the character is trying to remember something with 
great difficulty. The fragmented and interspliced characteristics of the scene can, 
in part, be explained by these “clues.” Another possibility is the narrative logic 
of the character’s search for his sister, including foreshadowing that something 
unfortunate might have happened between them. 
Sensory details from scene 7 are repeated in and connect with three other 
scenes: scene 4, which is the previously quoted scene where the character takes 
a spectator’s hand and pulls her toward him; scene 5, a tale of leaving his sister 
behind, sneaking into the TV room at night, and watching the walls close in on a TV 
character; and scene 13, in which our character pieces together an autobiographical 
story or explanation by recycling details from previous scenes. All of the details 
in scene 7 that are repeated elsewhere do also occur in scene 13, though never in 
exactly the same way. This connection is unique to scene 7 and makes the scene 
central to the perceptual dramaturgy of the piece.  
To offer an example of how connections and their effects can be traced, I will 
consider the details of “hand to face/touch face/slap” and “eyes close/closing.” In 
scenes 4 and 13 the sensory touch contributes to an episodic act: pretending to be 
slapped by the spectator or being slapped by his mother before he ventures out in 
the boat. The two slaps are both memorable because of their sensory impact and 
position in the episodes, and, thus, it is likely that the spectator will connect them. 
They are not, however, equal. While the mother’s slap offers an explanation for 
the earlier spectator interaction, the spectator interaction is more foregrounded 
and, therefore, haunts the mother’s slap. We cannot know which incidence affects 
the character’s memory of the other. This iterative association (which generates a 
montage collision in the episodic and semantic categories) does not occur when 
the touch is repeated in scene 5 and scene 7. In these scenes the character brings 
his hands to the part of his face that was slapped by the spectator. This touch, 
however, is unrelated to the other details and actions within the two scenes; these 
“touches” seem to be spliced in fragments that hardly register and, thus, are unlikely 
to be associated with other repetitions. If the slaps were fully integrated into the 
two scenes (as the spectator’s slap) they would register more and could generate 
additional associative and iterative connections. This type of connection would not 
only be made through the spectator, it would also allow the spectator to experience 
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the recycling dynamic of memory which the character is exploring. Therefore, 
once the spectator arrives at an understanding of the issue of memory in the piece 
it would be a reflection upon her own experience as well as a logical synthesis of 
the character’s experience. 
The repetitions of the sensory detail “eyes close/closing” are all emphasized, 
but very different. In scene 5, the character describes a childhood experience of 
watching walls closing in on a character on TV. In scene 7, he closes his eyes after 
failing to reach his sister. The beginning of scene 13 differs again, as the character 
closes his eyes in the cinema because an action movie becomes overwhelming. 
The different types of “closing” noted here are so different that they may not have 
the power to generate connections as they currently stand; however, the integration 
of a few assimilating or associative repetitions could address part of this issue by 
placing “closing” in focus as a pattern of perception before collision occurs. Another, 
but I think important, observation involves the end of scene 13 where the character 
“remembers” stepping onto the moon’s reflection on a lake’s surface at night. If 
an associative pattern of connections between the “closing” details is established, 
then it could be all the more effective to cut a spoken repetition of “eyes closing” 
in this scene and instead develop a physical “closing in” of the environment and a 
final “closing of his eyes” at the end of the play.
At present, the spectator knows of the character’s doubt about the source of 
his memories, but they are not given sufficient opportunity to experience the nature 
of his dilemma. Perhaps a solution lies in clearer attempts to relive the aspects of 
the memories that allow him to recycle fully embodied experiences. Similarly, one 
could try to break up the stylized movements with pedestrian gestures and pauses 
that relate to the “lived” details of the play-text. This strategy would be particularly 
effective if it were matched with the previously described strategy of consistently 
disconnecting movements and descriptions of mediated memories. The integration 
of “lived” words and movement would reveal the character’s attempt to recycle 
memories, while the disconnections would enable spectators to experience the 
breaking point of this attempt. If the gradual increase in memories of watching 
the media (as opposed to considering the mediated content personal experience) is 
caused by these breaking points, then the creative team may also discover a related 
reason for the character’s final choice. 
It is much easier to make visible the process of constructing a believable 
autobiographical self than it is to reveal that the construction is a product of 
the character’s failure to fill in the gaps in his lived memories with mediated 
content. A step toward a solution to this challenge is to ensure that the constructed 
autobiography cannot fully explain previous occurrences of the recycled details. 
If the potential perceptual paths and effects outlined here are, indeed, what the 
creative team wishes to achieve, then the analysis of perceptual connections can 
be used to determine how the full network of recycled details can be expanded and 
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tightened to establish the character’s search and self construction.
 
Conclusion
Dramaturgical strategies of composition are developed from hypotheses about 
an audience’s experience in a future performance situation. Perceptual dramaturgy 
provides unprecedented tools to advance and further qualify such hypotheses. 
Instead of applying the principles of predetermined dramaturgical models or 
targeting the intellectual interpretation that a spectator might arrive at after leaving 
the theatre, perceptual dramaturgy makes it possible to both hypothesize and 
strategize about the complex perceptual experiences that given creative material 
can facilitate in performance. Although these tools can be applied broadly to 
theatre, performance, and dance, perceptual dramaturgy is particularly effective in 
projects like Swimmer (68) where the principles used to facilitate a devising process 
directly impact the development of compositional strategies. In such projects, the 
perceptual dramaturgy of creation invests in, challenges, and cross-pollinates the 
habits of the artists involved and the perceptual dramaturgy of composition can 
potentially invite the spectator to direct her attention differently and discover new 
ways of synthesizing and responding to sensory stimuli. 
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